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Abstract. In a dependent type theory satisfying the propositions as
types correspondence together with the proofs-as-programs paradigm,
the validity of the unique choice rule or even more of the choice rule says
that the extraction of a computable witness from an existential statement
under hypothesis can be performed within the same theory.
Here we show that the unique choice rule, and hence the choice rule,
are not valid both in Coquand’s Calculus of Constructions with indexed
sum types, list types and binary disjoint sums and in its predicative
version implemented in the intensional level of the Minimalist Founda-
tion. This means that in these theories the extraction of computational
witnesses from existential statements must be performed in a more ex-
pressive proofs-as-programs theory.
1 Introduction
Type theory is nowadays both a subfield of mathematical logic and of computer
science. A perfect example of type theory studied both by mathematicians and
by computer scientists is Martin-Lo¨f’s type theory [21], for short ML. This is a
dependent type theory which can be indeed considered both as a paradigm of
a typed functional programming language and as a foundation of constructive
mathematics. The reason is that, on one hand, types can be seen to represent
data types and typed terms to represent programs. On the other hand, both
sets and propositions can be represented as types and both elements of sets and
proofs of propositions can be represented as typed terms. These identifications
are named in the literature as the propositions-as-types paradigm or the proofs-
as-programs correspondence or Curry-Howard correspondence.
An important application of dependent type theory to programming is that
one can use a type theory such as ML to construct a correct and terminating
program as a typed term meeting a certain specification defined as its type.
Pushing forward this correspondence one may ask whether from the proof-term
p(x) of an existential statement under hypothesis
p(x) ∈ ∃y ∈ B R(x, y) [x ∈ A]
one may extract a functional program f ∈ A → B whose graph is contained in
the graph of R(x, y), namely for which we can prove that there exists a proof-
term q(x) such that we can derive
q(x) ∈ R(x, f(x)) [x ∈ A]
This property is called choice rule. Then, we call unique choice rule the corre-
sponding property starting from a proof-term of a unique esistential statement
p(x) ∈ ∃!y ∈ B R(x, y) [x ∈ A]
from which we may extract a functional term f ∈ A → B whose graph is
contained in the graph of R(x, y).
It is worth noting that such choice rules characterizes constructive arith-
metics, i.e arithmetics within intuitionistic logic, with respect to classical Peano
arithmetics (see [25, 26]).
In Martin-Lo¨f’s type theory both the unique choice rule and the choice rule
are valid given that they follow from the validity of the axiom of choice
( AC ) ∀x ∈ A ∃y ∈ B R(x, y) −→ ∃f ∈ A→ B ∀x ∈ A R(x, f(x))
thanks to the identification of the ML-existential quantifier with the the strong
indexed sum of a set family, which characterizes the so called propositions-as-sets
isomorphism.
However in other dependent type theories proposed as foundations for con-
structive mathematics the existential quantifier is not identified with the strong
indexed sum type whilst it is still a type of its proofs. As a consequence in such
theories the validity of the mentioned choice rules is not evident.
A notable example of such a dependent type theory is Coquand’s Calculus
of Inductive Constructions [6, 7] used as a logical base of the proof-assistant
Coq [5, 4] and Matita [3, 2]. Here we consider its fragment CC+ extending the
original system in [6] with indexed sum types, list types and binary disjoint sums.
In CC+ propositions are defined primitively by postulating the existence of an
impredicative type of propositions. In particular in CC+ the identification of the
existential quantifier with the strong indexed sum type is not possible because
it makes the typed system logically inconsistent (see [6]). In fact in CC+ the
axiom of choice and even the axiom of unique choice
( AC! ) ∀x ∈ A ∃!y ∈ B R(x, y) −→ ∃f ∈ A→ B ∀x ∈ A R(x, f(x))
are not generally provable as shown in [24]. In [24] it was left open whether the
choice rule is validated in the original system [6]. Here we show that the choice
rule is not validated in CC+ by proving that in CC+ the unique choice rule
implies the axiom of unique choice and hence it is not valid. Of course, from this
it follows that also the choice rule is not valid in CC+.
Another example of foundation for constructive mathematics based on a
dependent type theory where the existential quantifier is given primitively is the
Minimalist Foundation, for short MF, ideated by the author in joint work with
G. Sambin in [16] and completed in [12]. An important feature of MF, which
is not present in other foundations like CC+ or ML, is that it constitutes a
common core among the most relevant constructive and classical foundations,
introduced both in type theory, in category theory and in axiomatic set theory.
Moreover it is a two-level system equipped with an intensional level suitable
for extraction of computational contents from its proofs, an extensional level
formulated in a language as close as possible to that of ordinary mathematics
and an interpretation of the latter in the former showing that the extensional
level has been obtained by abstraction from the intensional one according to
Sambin’s forget-restore principle in [23].
The two-level structure of MF brings many advantages in comparison to a
single level foundation for constructive mathematics as CC+ or ML.
First of all the intensional level of MF, called mTT in [12] for Minimalist
Type theory, can be used as a base for computer-aided formalization of proofs
done at the extensional level of MF. Moreover, we can show the compatibility
of MF with other constructive foundations at the most appropriate level: the
intensional level of MF can be easily interpreted in intensional theories such
as those formulated in type theory, for example Martin-Lo¨f’s type theory [21]
or the Calculus of Inductive Constructions, while its extensional level can be
easily interpreted in extensional theories such as those formulated in axiomatic
set theory, for example Aczel’s constructive set theory [1], or those formulated
in category theory as topoi [10, 11].
Both intensional and extensional levels of MF consist of type systems based
on versions of Martin-Lo¨f’s type theory with the addition of a primitive notion
of propositions: the intensional one is based on [21] and the extensional one is
based on [20].
In particular mTT constitutes a predicative counterpart of CC+ and to
which the argument disproving the validity of the unique choice in CC+ adapts
perfectly well.
As a consequence of our results we get that the extraction of programs com-
puting witnesses of existential statements under hypothesis proved in CC+ or
in mTT needs to be performed in a more expressive proofs-as-programs theory.
We also believe that the arguments presented here can be adapted to conclude
the same statements even for CC+ with generic inductive definitions.
It is worth noting that we can choose Martin-Lo¨f’s type theory as a more ex-
pressive theory where to perform the mentioned witness extraction from proofs
done in mTT. Another option is to perform such a witness extraction in the
realizability model of mTT extended with the axiom of choice and the formal
Church thesis constructed in [9] (note that the axiom of choice and the for-
mal Church thesis say that we can extract computable functions from number-
theoretic total relations). Furthermore, in the case we limit ourselves to extract
computable witnesses from unique existential statements proven in mTT then
we can use other realizability models such as that in [17, 18] validating mTT
extended with the axiom of unique choice and the formal Church thesis.
To perform witness extraction from proofs of existential statements done in
CC+, an impredicative version of Martin-Lo¨f’s type theory is not available. We
do not even know whether there exists a realizability model proving consistency
of CC+ extended with the axiom of choice and the formal Church thesis.
2 The dependent type theory DTΣ and the choice rules
Here we briefly describe a fragment, called DTΣ , of the intensional type theory
mTT of the Minimalist Foundation in [12] which is sufficient to show that the
unique choice rule implies the axiom of unique choice. This is the fragment of
mTT needed to interpret many-sorted predicate intuitionistic logic where sorts
are closed under strong indexed sums, dependent products and also comprehen-
sion.
DTΣ is a dependent type theory written in the style of Martin-Lo¨f’s type
theory [21] by means of the following four kinds of judgements:
A type [Γ ] A = B type [Γ ] a ∈ A [Γ ] a = b ∈ A [Γ ]
that is the type judgement (expressing that something is a specific type), the type
equality judgement (expressing that two types are equal), the term judgement
(expressing that something is a term of a certain type) and the term equality
judgement (expressing the definitional equality between terms of the same type),
respectively, all under a context Γ .
The word type is used as a meta-variable to indicate two kinds of entities:
sets and small propositions, namely
type ∈ {set, props }
Therefore, in DTΣ types are actually formed by using the following judgements:
A set [Γ ] φ props [Γ ]
saying that A is a set and that φ is a small proposition of DTΣ .
It is worth noting that the adjective small is there because in mTT we defined
small propositions as those propositions closed under quantification over sets,
while generic propositions may be closed under quantification over collections.
In DTΣ there are no collections and hence all “DTΣ-propositions” are small
but we keep the adjective to make DTΣ a proper fragment of mTT.
As in the intensional version of Martin-Lo¨f’s type theory and in mTT, in
DTΣ there are two kinds of equality concerning terms: one is the definitional
equality of terms of the same type given by the judgement
a = b ∈ A [Γ ]
which is decidable, and the other is the propositional equality written
Id(A, a, b) props [Γ ]
which is not necessarily decidable.
We now proceed by briefly describing the various kinds of types in DTΣ ,
starting from small propositions and then passing to sets.
Small Propositions in mTT include all the logical constructors of intuition-
istic predicate logic with equality and quantifications restricted to sets:
φ props ≡ ⊥ | φ ∧ ψ | φ ∨ ψ | φ→ ψ | ∀x∈A φ | ∃x∈A φ | Id(A, a, b)
provided that A is a set. Their rules are those for the corresponding small propo-
sitions in mTT.
In order to close sets under comprehension and to define operations on such
sets, we need to think of propositions as types of their proofs:
props-into-set)
φ props
φ set
Then sets in DTΣ include the following:
A set ≡ φ props | Σx∈AB | Πx∈AB
where the notation Σx∈AB stands for the strong indexed sum of the family of
sets B set [x ∈ A] indexed on the set A and Πx∈AB for the dependent product
set of the family of sets B set [x ∈ A] indexed on the set A.
Their rules are those for the corresponding sets in mTT and we refer to [12]
for their precise formulation.
Both DTΣ as well as mTT can be also essentially seen as fragments of a
typed system, which we call CC+, extending the Calculus of Constructions in
[6] with the inductive rules in [7, 5, 4] defining binary disjoint sums, list types
and strong indexed sums (see [12]).
For their crucial role to get the results in this paper, here we just recall the
rules of formation, introduction, elimination and conversion of the strong in-
dexed sum as a set:
Strong Indexed Sum
F-Σ)
C(x) set [x ∈ B]
Σx∈BC(x) set
I-Σ)
b ∈ B c ∈ C(b) C(x) set [x ∈ B]
〈b, c〉 ∈ Σx∈BC(x)
E-Σ)
M(z) set [z ∈ Σx∈BC(x)]
d ∈ Σx∈BC(x) m(x, y) ∈M(〈x, y〉) [x ∈ B, y ∈ C(x)]
ElΣ(d,m) ∈M(d)
C-Σ)
M(z) set [z ∈ Σx∈BC(x)]
b ∈ B c ∈ C(b) m(x, y) ∈M(〈x, y〉) [x ∈ B, y ∈ C(x)]
ElΣ( 〈b, c〉,m ) = m(b, c) ∈M(〈b, c〉)
By using these rules we recall that we can define the following projections
pi1(z) ≡ ElΣ( z, (x, y).x) ∈ B [z ∈ Σx∈BC(x)]
pi2(z) ≡ ElΣ( z, (x, y).y) ∈ C(pi1(z)) [z ∈ Σx∈BC(x)]
satisfying
pi1(〈b, c〉) = b ∈ B [Γ ] pi2(〈b, c〉) = c ∈ C(b) [Γ ]
provided that C(x) set [Γ, x ∈ B], b ∈ B [Γ ] and c ∈ C(b) [Γ ] are derivable in
DTΣ .
We also recall the following abbreviations: for set A set [Γ ] and B set [Γ ] we
define the set of functions from A to B as
A→ B ≡ Πx∈AB
Now we are ready to define the choice rule:
Definition 1. The dependent type theory DTΣ satisfies the choice rule if for
every small proposition R(x, y) props [x ∈ A, y ∈ B] derivable in DTΣ , for any
derivable judgement in DTΣ of the form
p(x) ∈ ∃y∈B R(x, y) [x ∈ A]
there exists in DTΣ a typed term
f(x) ∈ B[x ∈ A]
for which we can find a proof-term q(x) and derive in DTΣ
q(x) ∈ R(x, f(x)) [x ∈ A]
Then we recall the definition of the axiom of choice by internalizing the above
choice rule as follows:
Definition 2. The axiom of choice is the following small proposition
( AC ) ∀x ∈ A ∃y ∈ B R(x, y) −→ ∃f ∈ A→ B ∀x ∈ A R(x, f(x))
defined for any small proposition R(x, y) props [x ∈ A, y ∈ B].
A special instance of the choice rule is the following unique choice rule
Definition 3. The dependent type theory DTΣ satisfies the unique choice rule
if for every small proposition R(x, y) props [x ∈ A, y ∈ B] derivable in DTΣ , for
any derivable judgement in DTΣ of the form
p(x) ∈ ∃!y∈B R(x, y) [x ∈ A]
there exists a typed term f(x) ∈ B[x ∈ A] for which we can find a proof-term
q(x) and derive in DTΣ
q(x) ∈ R(x, f(x)) [x ∈ A]
where
∃!y ∈ B R(x, y) ≡
∃y ∈ B R(x, y) ∧ ∀y1, y2 ∈ B ( R(x, y1) ∧ R(x, y1)→ Id(B, y1, y2) )
Then the axiom of unique choice is the internal form of the unique choice
rule defined as follows:
Definition 4. The axiom of unique choice is the following small proposition
( AC! ) ∀x ∈ A ∃!y ∈ B R(x, y) −→ ∃f ∈ A→ B ∀x ∈ A R(x, f(x))
defined for any small proposition R(x, y) props [x ∈ A, y ∈ B].
Observe the following obvious relation between the above rules and the cor-
responding axioms:
Lemma 1. If DTΣ satisfies the choice rule then DTΣ proves the unique choice
rule.
Lemma 2. If DTΣ proves the axiom of choice then DTΣ proves the axiom of
unique choice.
Now we are ready to show the following crucial proposition:
Proposition 1. If DTΣ satisfies the unique choice rule then DTΣ proves the
axiom of unique choice.
Proof. Suppose that R(x, y) props [x ∈ A, y ∈ B] is derivable in DTΣ . Observe
that we can derive in DTΣ
pi2(z) ∈ ∃!y∈B R(pi1(z), y) [z ∈ Σx∈A ∃!y∈B R(x, y)]
Suppose now that the unique choice rule is valid in DTΣ . Then, by using this
rule there exists a typed term
f(z) ∈ B [z ∈ Σx∈A ∃!y∈B R(x, y)]
and a proof-term q(z) of DTΣ for which we can derive
q(z) ∈ R(pi1(z), f(z)) [z ∈ Σx∈A ∃!y∈B R(x, y)]
By using these proof-terms we can derive
〈m(w), h(w)〉 ∈ ∃g∈A→B ∀x ∈ A R(x, g(x)) [w ∈ ∀x∈A ∃!y∈B R(x, y)]
where
m(w) ≡ λx′.f(〈x′, w(x′)〉)
since we can derive
w(x′) ∈ ∃!y∈B R(x′ , y ) [w ∈ ∀x∈A ∃!y∈B R(x, y), x′ ∈ A]
and
〈x′, w(x′)〉 ∈ Σx∈A ∃!y∈B R(x, y) [w ∈ ∀x∈A ∃!y∈B R(x, y), x′ ∈ A]
and where
h(w) ≡ λx′′.q( 〈x′′, w(x′′)〉 ) ∈ ∀x ∈ A R(x , m(w)(x) )
since
q( 〈x′′, w(x′′)〉 ) ∈ R(pi1( 〈x′′, w(x′′)〉 ) , f( 〈x′′, w(x′′)〉 ) ) = R(x′′ , m(w)(x′′) )
for x′′ ∈ A and w ∈ ∀x∈A ∃!y∈B R(x, y).
Finally we conclude that
λw.〈m(w), h(w)〉 ∈
∀x ∈ A ∃!y ∈ B R(x, y) −→ ∃f ∈ A→ B ∀x ∈ A R(x, f(x))
i.e. we conclude that the axiom of unique choice is valid in DTΣ .
Observe that the above proof can be adapted to show that also the choice
rule implies its axiomatic form by simply replacing ∃!y∈B with ∃y∈B in the
proof of Proposition 1 and hence we also get:
Proposition 2. If DTΣ satisfies the choice rule then DTΣ satisfies the axiom
of choice.
By definition DTΣ is a fragment of mTT and therefore by repeating the
proofs above we conclude that:
Proposition 3. If mTT satisfies the unique choice rule then mTT satisfies the
axiom of unique choice.
Proposition 4. If mTT satisfies the choice rule then mTT satisfies the axiom
of choice.
Now, observe that DTΣ can be seen essentially as a fragment of CC
+ after
interpreting DTΣ-sets as CC
+-sets and DTΣ-small propositions as the corre-
sponding CC+-propositions. In the same way mTT can be also viewed essen-
tially as a fragment of CC+ as first described in [12]. Therefore, we also get the
following:
Proposition 5. If CC+ satisfies the unique choice rule then it satisfies the
axiom of unique choice.
Proposition 6. If CC+ satisfies the choice rule then CC+ satisfies the axiom
of choice.
Note that the above propositions hold also for the extension of CC+ with
inductive definitions [7].
Then, we recall the following result by T. Streicher:
Theorem 1 (T. Streicher). CC+ does not validate the axiom of unique choice
and hence the axiom of choice.
Proof. This is based on [24] and the fact that types are interpreted as assemblies
which can be organized into a lextensive regular locally cartesian closed category
with a natural numbers object [8, 22].
Again since DTΣ and mTT can be both viewed essentially as fragments of
CC+, we also get from Theorem 1:
Corollary 1. Both DTΣ and mTT do not validate the axiom of unique choice
and hence the axiom of choice.
Now from Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 we get:
Theorem 2. DTΣ does not validate the unique choice rule and hence the choice
rule.
Analogously, from Proposition 3 and Corollary 1 we also get:
Theorem 3. mTT does not validate the unique choice rule and hence the
choice rule.
And from Proposition 5 and Theorem 1 we finally get:
Theorem 4. CC+ does not validate the unique choice rule and hence the choice
rule.
We conclude by saying that, as suggested by T. Streicher, it is very plausible
that the model in [24] can be extended to interpret generic inductive definitions
and hence to show that the axiom of unique choice is not provable in CC+
extended with generic inductive definitions. Therefore, if this is confirmed, from
Proposition 5 we can conclude that the unique choice rule is not valid even in
this extension of CC+.
Remark 1. We believe that in the context of categorical models of dependent
type theories we can prove categorical results corresponding to Propositions 1,2.
Indeed, the relationship between the choice rules and their axiomatic form
in Propositions 1,2 was inspired by categorical investigations done in a series
of papers [14],[13],[15] about setoid models used in dependent type theory to
interpret quotient sets. In particular these papers focus their analysis on the
quotient model used in [12] to interpret the extensional level of the Minimalist
Foundation into its intensional level mTT. As shown in [19], the model used in
[12] coincides with the usual exact completion in category theory if and only if
the unique choice rule is valid in the completion. We expect to be able to prove
also in the context of [19] that the unique choice rule implies the axiom of unique
choice, as well as that the choice rule implies the axiom of choice.
3 Conclusion
From the above results it follows that when proving a statement of the form
∀x∈A∃y ∈ B R(x, y)
in the dependent typed theory CC+ or in mTT we can not always extract a
functional term f ∈ A→ B computing the witness of the existential quantifica-
tion depending on a x ∈ A, within the theory itself and we need to find it in a
more expressive proofs-as-programs theory.
For mTT we can use Martin-Lo¨f’s type theory ML as the more expressive
theory where to perform the mentioned witness extraction. This is done by first
embedding into ML the proof-term
p ∈ ∀x∈A ∃y ∈ B R(x, y)
derived in mTT and then using ML-projections to extract f .
Another possibility is to perform this witness extraction in the realizability
model in [9] showing consistency of mTT extended with the Formal Church
thesis and the axiom of choice. Moreover, in the case we simply want to extract
computable witness from unique existential statements proved in mTT under
hypothesis we can use also other realizability models such as that in [17, 18]
showing consistency of mTT with the axiom of unique choice and the formal
Church thesis.
For CC+, and even more for its extension with inductive definitions, it is
an open problem whether there is a realizability model showing its consistency
with the axiom of choice and the formal Church thesis.
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